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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SELECTED
FERTILITY CONTROL POLICIES
LARRY D. BARNETTt
Contrary to widespread belief, the population of the United States
is still growing, and although the rate of increase is small, the number
of people added annually is substantial. In 1975, an excess of births
over deaths caused population to grow by 0.58%, representing approxi-
mately 100,000 more births than deaths every month.1 There seem
to be two major reasons for the belief that the population of the United
States is now stable. First, there has been a marked decline in the
growth rate since the time when the population control movement was
the focus of considerable attention and publicity. In 1970, when the
movement was at its zenith, the excess of births over deaths caused
population to increase by 0.89%2 or 1,810,000.3 Between 1970 and
1975, there was a decline of one-third in the number of people added
to the population annually and in the rate at which they were added.
However, the decline in rate occurred almost entirely prior to 1973.
Subsequently, there has been little change in the growth rate, with the
result that the constantly expanding base to which the rate is applied
has been generating an increasing excess of births over deaths. The
excess of 1,810,000 in 1970 fell to 1,162,000 in 1973 but increased
in 1974 and again in 1975, reaching 1,239,000 in the latter year.4
The second major reason for the public belief that the United
States has reached a point where the number of births equals the num-
ber of deaths lies in a misunderstanding of the demographic measure
known as the total fertility rate and a failure to appreciate the nature
of the age distribution of the population. The total fertility rate is a
hypothetical predictor of completed family size, but it has been widely
t Assistant Professor, Center for the Study of Law, Nova University, Fort Lau-
derdale, Florida. J.D., University of Florida; Ph.D., Florida State University; M.S.,
Oregon State University; B.A., University of California, Los Angeles.
1. 24 HEALTH RESOURCES AD., PuB. HEALTH SERV., MONTHLY VrrAL STATISTICS
REP., No. 13, at 1, 2 (1976) (vital statistics of the United States) [hereinafter cited as
VrrxL STATISTICS].
2. Calculated from data given in id. at 1.
3. 22 id., No. 11, Supp., at 1 (1974); id., No. 12, Supp., at 1.
4. Calculated from 24 id., No. 13, at 1, 2 (1976); 23 id., No. 13, at 1, 2 (1975);
id., No. 8, Supp., at 1 (1974); id., No. 8, Supp. 2, at 1; id., No. 3, Supp., at 1; id., No.
3, Supp. 3, at 1; 22 id., No. 11, Supp., at 1; id., No. 12, Supp., at 1.
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defined as actual completed family size. The total fertility rate predicts
the ultimate completed family size of women entering their child-
bearing period in the year the rate is calculated, but it is an accurate
predictor of this group's completed family size only if the then-existing
birth rates for women already in their childbearing years remain
unchanged while the group for which the* rate is calculated passes
through its childbearing years. These birth rates can and do change
substantially over the three decades the group is exposed to child-
bearing, making the total fertility rate a hypothetical measure of com-
pleted family size. For example, women who were 45 to 49 years of
age in 1975 had borne an average of 3.03 children each," but the total
fertility rates in 1940 and 1945 when they were entering their child-
bearing period were 2.30 and 2.49, respectively. 6 For this group of
women, then, the total fertility rate was significantly lower than actual
completed family size.
In 1977, the total fertility rate was 1.8 children per woman, and
the fact that it declined from 2.48 in 19707 and had fallen below the
"replacement level" of 2.1 helped convey the impression that popula-
tion was no longer growing in the United States. A rate of 2.1 would
immediately equalize the number of births and deaths if it were not
for the large proportion of adults currently in their childbearing years,
a result of the post-World War H baby boom. Because these adults
generate births but have a relatively low incidence of deaths-because
they add to the size of the population and also remain in it for a consid-
erable length of time afterward-a rate of 2.1 would result in the
expansion of the United States' population from 212 million in 1974
to 262 million in the year 2000 and 318 million in the year 2050.
A rate of 1.7 will result in a population of 245 million in the year 2000
and 250 million in the year 2025, with a decrease to 227 million in
2050.8 Only a total fertility rate of 1.2 will halt population growth
immediately.9
Since few women currently expect to have fewer than two
5. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REP., Series P-20, No. 288, at 8 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CURRENT Pop. REP.].
6. Id., Series P-23, No. 49, at 17 (1974).
7. 24 VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 1, No. 11, Supp. 2, at 7 (1976).
8. CURRENT Pop. REP., supra note 5, Series P-25, No. 601, at 36 (1975). The
projections assume a slight reduction in future mortality and a continuation of net immi-
gration of 400,000 annually.
9. Frejka, Reflections on the Demographic Conditions Needed to Establish a
U.S. Stationary Population Growth, 22 POPULATION STuDIEs 379, 382 (1968).
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children, 10 the population of the United States is not likely to stabilize
or decline in the near future unless there is either an appreciable
increase in the death rate or a drastic threat to the standard of living
that is clearly traceable in the public mind to continued population
growth, leading to the adoption of fertility control measures that go
beyond the mere provision of family planning services."' A threat suf-
ficient to generate such laws seems to be a distinct possibility. In 1975,
a committee of the National Research Council examined mineral
resources and concluded that "man faces the prospect of a series of
shocks of varying severity as shortages occur in one material after
another, with the first real shortages perhaps only a matter of a few
years away." 2 At approximately the same time, the Council on Environ-
mental Quality observed:
The United States is one of the more resource-rich nations in the
world. However, . . . the United States does not have sufficient
reserves of 47 . . . commodities . . . to satisfy cumulative de-
mands to the year 2000. . . . In fact, the United States now
imports from 90 to 100 percent of its needs in 8 important mater-
ials. . .; from 50 to 90 percent in another 12 materials . . .; and
15 to 50 percent of its needs in 14 more materials .... 13
This article will examine a number of possible fertility control
measures and their validity under the United States Constitution. The
10. In 1975, the percentage of wives in various age categories under 40 years who
expected to have fewer than two children ranged from 13% to 17%. CURRENT PoP.
REP., supra note 5, Series P-20, No. 288, at 5 (1976). Moreover, there is evidence that
recent birth expectations may understate future fertility. Blake, Can We Believe Recent
Data on Birth Expectations in the United States?, 11 DEMOGRAPHY 25 (1974). The
fact that the total fertility rate has fallen below 2.0 appears to be due to a postponement
of childbearing and to be temporary. Sklar & Berkov, The American Birth Rate: Evi-
dence of a Coming Rise, 189 SCIENCE 693 (1975); C. Gibson, Changes in Marital Status
and Marital Fertility and Their Contribution to the Decline in Period Fertility in the
United States: 1961-1973, at 6-8 (Apr. 17-19, 1975) (paper presented at 1975 annual
meeting of Population Association of America).
11. Davis, Population Policy: Will Current Programs Succeed?, 158 SCIENCE 730
(1967).
12. COMMITTEE ON MINERAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT, COMMISSION ON
NATURAL RESOURCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MINERAL RESOURCES AND THE EN-
VIRONMENT 26 (1975).
13. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 314 (5th
annual report, 1974). The United States thus appears vulnerable to severe resource
shortages within the foreseeable future. The social and individual consequences of such
shortages are rarely considered but are serious. Catton, Can Irrupting Man Remain
Human?, 26 BIOSCIENCE 262 (1976). Contrary views that there are no resource short-
ages facing the United States that can severely and permanently damage its economy
appear in Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 269 Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of
the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 40, 74-76,
113 (1974).
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laws chosen are those likely to appear attractive to a public committed
to population control.' Certainly, however, these laws do not exhaust
all possible measures. Indeed, one that will undoubtedly be seriously
considered-a tax surcharge on parents for excessive fertility-will not
be considered here, since its constitutional aspects have been treated
elsewhere.' However, it should be noted that a surcharge is probably
constitutional.' 6
FEES FOR EDUCATION
Given the financial problems facing education and the reluctance
of taxpayers to spend larger amounts ,of money on public schools and
universities, a system in which parents pay most or all of the cost of
educating their children may appear an attractive means for regulating
fertility. The economic burden on parents could be expected to reduce
family size, and taxes could be expected to fall; both benefits would
in all likelihood be substantial. The cost of educating a child would
be such that family size would inevitably decline. In 1975, the average
annual expenditure per pupil by state and local governments was
$1250.17 This was almost twice as much as in 1968, when the expen-
diture was $658,1 and if the rate of increase prevailing in the 1968-
1975 period continues, approximately $4500 will be spent annually per
pupil by 1990. Requiring parents to pay educational costs would not
only create strong pressures on fertility but also would allow substantial
relief for taxpayers, because at present approximately one-third of all
14. Fertility regulation measures cannot be justified unless childbearing is com-
pletely voluntary and unplanned pregnancies can be avoided or terminated. Assuming
that abortion remains legally available, such a situation appears likely to exist within
a few years. "It seems highly probable that by the end of the 1970s, almost all married
couples at risk of unintended pregnancy in the United States will be using contraception,
and almost all contraceptors will be protected by the most effective medical methods.
We are rapidly approaching universal, highly effective contraceptive practice." Westoff,
Trends in Contraceptive Practice: 1965-1973, 8 FAMILY PLANNING PnRSPECTVI 54,
57 (1976).
15. See Rabin, Population Control Through Financial Incentives, 23 HASTINGS
L.J. 1353, 1370-99 (1972). A system of payments designed to motivate couples to
restrict their fertility does not appear to be financially feasible. Barnett, Population
Policy: Payments for Fertility Limitation in the United States?, 16 SOCIAL BIOLOOY
239, 246-48 (1969). It will thus not be considered here.
16. See Rabin, supra note 15, at 1399.
17. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNrrED STATES: 1975, at 133 (96th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL
ABSTACr].
18. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF
UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 373 (1975).
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expenditures by state and local governments are devoted to educa-
tion.'
9
A system requiring parents to pay for the educational services
rendered their children would presumably have the following features:
(1) Minors would be required to attend school to age 16 or 17
as at present. Without a compulsory attendance require-
ment, the benefits of education to society would be lost and
the fertility-inhibiting effect of the fees charged parents
would be diminished to the extent that children were not sent
to school.
(2) Governmental subsidies would be made available to the
indigent to pay the charge imposed for education.
(3) The charge would be imposed only for children conceived
after enactment of the legislation creating the charge. Chil-
dren conceived and children born at the time the legislation is
enacted would not be subject to the fee, since there would
be no fertility-inhibiting effect on the parents as far as such
chfidren were concerned.
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,20 decided
by the United States Supreme Court in 1973, is the leading case on
the constitutional aspects of financing educational services. Plaintiffs
there attacked the use of property taxes to finance local schools, arguing
that poor school districts were able to spend less per student than rich
districts and that the classification based on wealth that was thereby
established violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The central problem facing the Court was the test to be
used in assessing the constitutionality of the system of financing educa-
tion. Should it carry a presumption of constitutionality and be judged
only in terms of whether it possesses a rational relationship to a legiti-
mate governmental purpose, or should the state bear the burden of
justifying the system by demonstrating that it is necessary to meet a
compelling governmental interest? If wealth is a "suspect" classifica-
tion or if education is a fundamental constitutional right that the system
penalizes, then the stricter test must be employed.2
Rodriguez holds that a law creating a classification based on
wealth is subject to the stricter compelling governmental interest test
19. STATISTnCAL ABsTRAcr, supra note 17, at 258.
20. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
21. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 96 S. Ct. 2513, 2516-17 (1976); Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330, 335-36 (1972).
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only if the individuals and groups negatively affected by the classifica-
tion possess two distinguishing characteristics:
(1) Because of their economic circumstances, they are "completely
unable" to pay for the desired benefit; and
(2) They consequently sustain "an absolute deprivation" of that
benefit.22
In Rodriguez, there was no absolute deprivation of educational services.
Students in poorer school districts were perhaps receiving an education
of lower quality than students in rich districts, but this was held by the
Court to be insufficient to invoke the compelling governmental inter-
est test: "[A]t least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection
Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advan-
tages. ' 23
Accordingly, it appears that state and local governments may
charge parents for educating their children as long as financial assist-
ance is provided to those parents unable to pay the charge so that their
children are not deprived of educational services. This conclusion is
supported by footnote 60 in the Rodriguez opinion:
If elementary and secondary education were made available by the
State only to those able to pay a tuition assessed against each
pupil, there would be a clearly defined class of 'poor' people-
definable in terms of their inability to pay the prescribed sum-
who would be absolutely precluded from receiving an education.
That case would present a far more compelling set of circumstances
for judicial assistance than the case before us today.24
Thus, while a charge may be levied by government for the educational
services it provides, financial assistance to indigents is necessary. How-
ever, even without the threat of judicial coercion, the benefits of
primary and secondary education to society appear to be such that gov-
ernment would want to make provision for pupils from indigent families
unable to pay the charge imposed.
A system of charging parents for educating their children will not
necessarily require a compelling governmental interest because it
creates a classification based on wealth, but such an interest will be
required if education is a fundamental constitutional right. The Court
in Rodriguez concluded that the standard for determining this question
is not the importance of education to society but, rather, whether educa-
22. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973).
23. Id. at 24.
24. Id. at 25 n.60,
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tion is a right explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.
Under this standard, the Court held that education was not a fundamen-
tal constitutional right.25
The Court's discussion of whether education is a fundamental right
suggests that a state need not provide free public education and that
imposing fees on parents to finance the educational system is constitu-
tional as long as the conditions under which the financed services are
offered are the same for all individuals and groups, for example, by
making the charge the same for all students in a particular grade.
Specifically, the Court said: "In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the oppor-
tunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the State has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms. 26
This language is consistent with another line of cases. The
Supreme Court has clearly stated that a state may limit expenditures
for education in order to preserve the fiscal integrity of its programs,
though in order to curb expenditures it may not intentionally bar a par-
ticular class of individuals (e.g., indigent children) from utilizing edu-
cational services.2 7 Johnson v. New York State Education Department,
a case in which a state refused to provide free textbooks to students
in grades one to six while providing them to students in grades seven
to twelve, reflects this reasoning. 8 Plaintiffs were recipients of public
assistance and parents of children attending public schools in grades
one to six. Unable to pay the $7.50 charge levied on each student for
textbooks, plaintiffs claimed a denial of equal protection. The court
rejected the claim and added that the legislature could constitutionally
refuse to provide free textbooks to all children in all grades in order
to conserve the state's fiscal resources. By extension this reasoning
could support a holding that the state could refuse to provide free edu-
cation in any form without violating the Constitution.
This conclusion appeared expressly in an Eighth Circuit case
contesting an annual enrollment fee of eight dollars for students in a
25. Id. at 33-34.
26. Id. at 30 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)) (em-
phasis added).
27. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
28. Johnson v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 319 F. Supp. 271 (E.D.N.Y. 1970),
af!'d, 449 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1971), vacated and remanded to determine mootness, 409
U.S. 75 (1972).
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public high school.29 A challenge to the validity of the fee was rejected
on the ground that the Constitution provides no federal right to a free
education by the state.80 The court held that the Constitution guaran-
tees only that, where the state has decided to provide education services,
the services must be available to all its citizens on the same terms.
In short, a system of fees imposed on parents to cover the costs
of the education of their children will bear a presumption of constitu-
tionality and will violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment only if it is not rationally related to a legitimate state pur-
pose, because the United States Constitution provides no fundamental
right to education and wealth will not be a suspect criterion unless there
is a clearly definable indigent class whose children are absolutely
deprived of an education. There is, moreover, anbther reason a system
of fees will be evaluated only in terms of whether it bears some rational
relationship to a proper state purpose, namely, the subject matter is that
of taxation.
"[I]n taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess
the greatest freedom in classification. Since the members of a
legislature necessarily enjoy a familiarity with local conditions
which this Court cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality
can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a
classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against par-
ticular persons and classes."''s
In order to avoid a challenge to a system of fees that will be tested
under the equal protection clause in terms of whether it satisfies a com-
pelling governmental interest and in order to provide the economic and
social benefits of universal education, the charges imposed on indigent
parents will have to be paid by government. The financial assistance
provided indigents, however, must not be permitted to subsidize educa-
tion in religiously oriented schools. In order to avoid the prohibition
of the first amendment against the establishment of religion, the sub-
sidy for indigents must be used for education in and paid directly to
secular schools. This restriction derives from a 1973 decision by the
Supreme Court in a case involving a tuition reimbursement plan pro-
vided by the State of New York for low-income parents sending their
29. Byrd v. Sexton, 277 F.2d 418 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 818 (1960).
30. Id. at 425. The Tenth Circuit has also adopted this view. Flemming v.
Adams, 377 F.2d 975, 977 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 898 (1967). However,
one federal district court recently suggested that there is a constitutional right to a mini-
mal level of education. Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
31. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41 (1973) (quoting
Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1940)).
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children to private schools.3 2 The annual reimbursement was limited
to $100 or fifty percent of the actual tuition paid, whichever was lower.
Since the vast majority of non-public schools in New York were church-
related, the Court held the plan unconstitutional on the ground that it
had the direct and immediate effect of -advancing religion by relieving
the financial burdens on parents sufficiently to provide them with the
option of sending their children to religiously oriented schools. It was
unimportant to the Court that the state law at issue did not require the
money received to be spent on education and that the parents could
spend the money on other items.
The preceding discussion has examined the constitutionality of
fees imposed by a state on parents for educational services provided
their children. To have a nationwide effect in reducing the birth rate,
the fee system would have to be adopted by most or all states. This
raises the question whether the federal government could require the
adoption of a fee system by the states, and the answer is probably nega-
tive. An argument could be made that the power of the federal
government under the commerce clause33 to regulate interstate com-
merce is sufficient to permit a federal requirement that states adopt a
fee system inasmuch as the effect of educational services on interstate
commerce can undoubtedly be shown to be substantial. However, the
1976 Supreme Court decision in National League of Cities v. Usery
suggests that such reasoning will not be accepted.34 That case involved
the validity of the extension of federal minimum wage and maximum
hour provisions to state and local governments under the Fair Labor
Standards Act. The Court held that the commerce clause does not pro-
vide the federal government with the authority to alter or displace the
ability of state and local governments to structure relationships with
their employees in services they traditionally perform. Public health,
recreation, and police protection
are typical of those [activities] performed by state and local
governments in discharging their dual functions of administering
the public law and furnishing public services. Indeed, it is func-
tions such as these which governments are created to provide, ser-
32. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973). Parents cannot be required, however, to send their children to secular schools
but must have the option to send them to church-related schools if they so wish. Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518-19 (1925). Indigent parents exercising this op-
tion would not, of course, be eligible for financial assistance.
33. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
34. National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).
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vices such as these which the States have traditionally afforded
their citizens. If Congress may withdraw from the States the
authority to make those fundamental employment decisions upon
which their systems for performance of these functions must rest,
we think there would be little left of the States' "separate and
independent existence." 85
The provision of education is clearly a traditional function of states
and their political subdivisions, 6 and thus the means by which educa-
tional services are financed would seem to be within their purview.
Education financing appears to be as much within the traditional powers
of state and local governments as the wages paid to and the hours
worked by their employees. Thus, the federal government could not
compel the adoption of a fee system for financing education, though
it could apparently make enticements available to this end.
In conclusion, a state is under no obligation by the United States
Constitution to provide free public education to its citizens, and it may
charge parents to pay the cost of educating their children. Because
a state may require parents to send -their children to school,17 the
impact on fertility would be substantial if parents were required to pay
most or all of the actual cost. Whatever system of fees is adopted will
be tested under the equal protection clause only in terms of whether
it rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose. The serious economic
and ecological problems that are likely to exist by the time a commit-
ment is made to regulate fertility will constitute a threat to the public
health and welfare, the protection of which is clearly a valid state pur-
pose,38 and a system of fees which is the same for all persons similarly
situated should have little difficulty being upheld as rationally related
to that purpose inasmuch as it cannot help but reduce fertility and alle-
viate the population pressures behind economic and ecological prob-
lems.
RAISING THE AGE OF MARRIAGE
Fertility regulation may well be combined with an attempt to attain
other desired ends. In particular, measures may appear attractive that
seem likely to reduce not only family size but also the incidence of
divorce. The divorce rate in the United States is currently at its highest
35. Id. at 2474.
36. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 2Q5, 213 (1972).
37. See id. at 233; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
38. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1905).
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point in history and is continuing to increase; in 1974, almost two per-
cent of all married women became divorced.3 9 Individuals marrying
under age twenty have been found by a number of studies to have a
substantially higher rate of marital dissolutions than those marrying
after reaching twenty,40 yet thirty-one percent ot all brides and fourteen
percent of all grooms in 1974 married before their twentieth birthday.41
Consequently, raising the minimum age for a marriage license to at
least twenty years might markedly reduce the divorce rate.4 -
An increase in the minimum age for entering marriage has
seemed to a number of observers a likely means for reducing fertility.
43
In the words of one:
Since the female reproduction span is short and generally more
fecund in its first than in its second half, postponement of marriage
to ages beyond 20 tends biologically to reduce births. Sociologi-
cally, it gives women time to get a better education, acquire inter-
ests unrelated to the family, and develop a cautious attitude toward
pregnancy. Individuals who have not married by the time they are
in their late twenties often do not marry at all.
44
The evidence from survey research supports the argument that an
increase in the minimum marriage age will reduce fertility. The latest
Current Population Survey on fertility by the Bureau of the Census found
that expected lifetime births fell substantially as age at first marriage
39. 25 VITAL STATISiCS, supra note 1, No. 1, Supp., at 1; see id., No. 6, at 2.
40. Bumpass & Sweet, Differentials in Marital Instability: 1970, 37 AM. SocIoLoa-
ICAL REV. 754, 755, 759 (1972); Glick & Norton, Frequency, Duration, and Probability
of Marriage and Divorce, 33 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 307 (1971); Rosenwaike, Differen-
tials in Divorce in Maryland, 6 DEMOGRAPHY 151 (1969).
41. Calculated from 25 VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 1, No. 2, Supp., at 3.
42. To the extent that such a measure delayed childbearing until women reached
their twenties, there would also be a reduction, though limited, in the incidence of ma-
ternal and infant mortality. Nortman, Parental Age as a Factor in Pregnancy Outcome
and Child Development, in REPORTS ON POPULATION/FAMILY PLANNING 7, 8, 15, 30, 33,
37 (Population Council No. 16, 1974).
It is possible that a higher minimum marriage age will promote cohabitation among
young adults and thus have an effect inconsistent with current public policy. See Bell
v. Lone Oak Indep. School Dist., 507 S.W.2d 636, 638 (Tex. Civ. App . 1974), vacated
as moot, 515 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. 1974). However, between 1960 and 1970, the minimum
age evidently remained constant but the numerical increase in cohabitation among those
18-24 years of age was 50-fold for men and 16-fold for women. P. Glick, Living Ar-
rangements of Children and Young Adults 8-9 (Apr. 17-19, 1975) (paper presented at
1975 annual meeting of Population Association of America). If the 1960-1970 trend
persists, it is doubtful that a higher minimum marriage age by itself would appreciably
foster cohabitation.
43. Berelson, Beyond Family Planning, in STuDiEs IN FAMILY PLANNING 2, 10
(Population Council No. 38, 1969).
44. Davis, supra note 11, at 737 (footnote omitted).
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increased. For example, the mean number of children expected to be
born to wives 25 to 29 years of age in 1975 was 2.7 among those mar-
ried before they were 18 years old, 2.4 among those married when they
were 18 or 19 years old, 2.1 among those married when they were 20
to 24 years old, and 1.9 among those married when they were 25 to
29 years old.4 5 A more sophisticated analysis of data from three nation-
wide surveys found that expected family size declined with an increasing
age at first marriage except among individuals having attended college.40
However, raising the minimum marriage age to at least twenty
years will lower the birth rate only if the births that would have
occurred prior to the twentieth birthday never take place. If they occur
outside marriage or are simply delayed until marriage, the higher mini-
mum age may reduce divorce but will not significantly affect the
volume of births. 7 By itself, raising the minimum age for a marriage
license may not have the desired effect on birth rates, and the increase
in marital age may well have to be supplemented by sanctions directly
affecting fertility, for example, a tax surcharge. Certainly, raising the
age for a marriage license will have to be accompanied by sanctions
on illegitimacy. In 1974, 13.2% of all births in the United States were
illegitimate, a percentage that has risen steadily for the past quarter
century. On the other hand, illegitimate births are the responsibility
of a relatively small fraction of unmarried women-in 1974, just
2.4%. Since the proportion of all births which are illegitimate is
substantial and increasing but the proportion of unmarried women hav-
ing illegitiate births is small, it is clear that sanctions against illegiti-
macy are a desirable if not necessary correlate of an increased age at
45. CuRRENT Pop. REP., supra note 5, at 7.
46. Bumpass, Age at Marriage as a Variable in Socio-Econonic Differentials it
Fertility, 6 DEMoGRAPHY 45, 51 (1969). Since a college education appears to neutralize
the effect on family size of age at marriage, it is important ,to note that 40% of all
persons 25 to 29 years of age and 34% of all persons 30 to 34 years of age had com-
pleted at least one year of college in 1974. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 17, at
119. As a fertility control measure, raising the age of marriage would thus be ineffec-
tive for a large segment of the childbearing population.
47. A lower divorce rate among Caucasians would have no appreciable effect in
and of itself on the completed family size of whites, but a lower divorce rate among
nonwhites would substantially increase nonwhite family size. A. Thornton, The Effect
of Marital Disruption on Childspacing and Family Sizes: Black-White Differentials 5
(Apr. 17-19, 1975) (paper presented at 1975 annual meeting of Population Association
of America). Since nonwhites are only a small portion of the total population, however,
the overall impact on fertility of a lowered divorce rate would not appear to be signifi-
cant.
48. STATIsTICAL ABsmAcT, supra note 17, at 57; 24 VITAL STATISTICS, supra note
1, No. 11, Supp. 2, at 11.
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marriage and that such sanctions need be imposed on only a small seg-
ment of the childbearing population.49
If raising the minimum age for a marriage license to twenty years
or higher averts all or most of the, births that would have otherwise
occurred among younger women, a substantial reduction in births can
be effected. In 1974, women nineteen years of age and younger were
responsible for one in every five births.5" However, such an increase
in the minimum marriage age might well face a constitutional challenge.
The Supreme Court has long held that a state possesses the power
to regulate the conditions under which marriage may occur within its
borders. As early as 1888, the Court said:
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having
more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any
other institution, has always been subject to the control of the legis-
lature. That body prescribes the age at which parties may contract
to marry, the procedure or form essential to constitute marriage,
the duties and obligations it creates, . . . and the acts which may
constitute grounds for its dissolution.51
The power to regulate marriage is an aspect of the state's police
power, but it is not absolute. Marriage is a fundamental constitutional
right which may be denied or penalized under the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Constitution only when necessary to
advance a compelling governmental interest. A law prohibiting inter-
racial marriage is thus unconstitutional,5 2 as are regulations prohibiting
married high school students from participating in extracurricular,
school-sponsored activities or regulations prohibiting marriage among
cadets at the United States Merchant Marine Academy. 3 There is no
49. It is too early to ascertain the long-term impact on illegitimacy of the 1973
abortion decision of the United States Supreme Court, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). It has been estimated that, in 1975, only 56% of all women in need of an
abortion were able to secure one. Weinstock, Tietze, Jaffe, & Dryfoos, Abortion Need
and Services in the United States, 1974-1975, 8 FAMELY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 59
(1976). Universally available abortion services appear capable of arresting the upward
trend in the proportion of all births that are illegitimate. Sklar & Berkov, Abortion,
Illegitimacy, and the American Birth Rate, 185 SCIENCE 910 (1974).
50. Calculated from 24 Vrr STATiSTCS, supra note 1, No. 11, Supp. 2, at 10.
51. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (emphasis added).
52. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
53. O'Neill v. Dent, 364 F. Supp. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Hollon v. Mathis Indep.
School Dist., 358 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D. Tex. 1973), vacated as moot, 491 F.2d 92 (5th
Cir. 1974); Moran v. School Dist. #7, 350 F. Supp. 1180 (D. Mont. 1972); Holt v.
Shelton, 341 F. Supp. 821 (M.D. Tenn. 1972); Bell v. Lone Oak Indep. School Dist.,
507 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App.), vacated as moot, 515 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. 1974).
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compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify the denial of or
penalty upon marriage in such situations.
The economic and ecological conditions that will exist when fertil-
ity control measures such as an increased minimum marriage age are
adopted should easily be held to constitute a compelling governmental
interest. However, since marriage age is not related to fertility among
the college-educated and since this is a substantial segment of the child-
bearing population, 54 an increased age is of questionable necessity in
promoting that interest. That is, the relationship which exists between
low marriage age and high fertility may not sufficiently reduce fertility
to justify an increased marriage age as necessary to promote the com-
pelling governmental interest in alleviating economic and ecological
problems. Thus, if a higher minimum age is to be constitutional under
the due process and equal protection clauses, the test may have to be
one of reasonableness. A distinction exists between laws that merely
delay the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right and those that
entirely prohibit or permanently penalize it. In the cases cited in the
preceding paragraph, the compelling governmental interest test was
applied in situations where marriage was prohibited among certain indi-
viduals or where public facilities made available to the unmarried were
permanently prohibited to the married, penalizing the latter for entering
into legally valid marriages. However, the minimum marriage age ap-
pears to be of a different nature inasmuch as its effect is merely to delay
rather than to prohibit or permanently penalize marriage. Accordingly,
while the minimum marriage age may have to be the same for males and
females,55 a challenge to a minimum age that is the same for both sexes
may be conceptualized as involving only an age classification. Such a
classification does not bring forth the compelling governmental interest
test; its constitutionality is evaluated only in terms of whether it is
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.5 6 An increased
minimum marriage age would probably be constitutional under the
latter test. States already prescribe a minimum age for, and hence
delay, marriages "[i]n keeping with the increasing complexity of our
54. See note 46 supra.
55. Phelps v. Bing, 58 Ill. 2d 32, 316 N.E.2d 775 (1974); Berger v. Adornato, 76
Misc. 2d 122, 350 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Onondaga County Sup. Ct. 1973); cf. Stanton v. Stan-
ton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (different age of majority for males and females for purpose
of child support statute violates equal protection). Contra, Friedrich v. Katz, 73 Misc.
2d 663, 341 N.Y.S.2d 932 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct. Spec. T. 1973), rev'd as moot, 34
N.Y.2d 987, 318 N.E.2d 606, 360 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1974).
56. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976).
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modem civilization and the absolute necessity of a certain amount of
maturity and knowledge on the part of each member thereof. .. .
The economic and ecological problems leading to an increase in the
minimum age should readily constitute a legitimate governmental inter-
est, and the relationship between marriage age and fertility, though
limited, should be sufficient to justify a higher age as a reasonable
means of furthering that interest, especially if a lowered divorce rate
is included in the interest.
Whether an increased minimum marriage age will be seen as
simply an age classification or as an infringement upon the fundamental
right of marriage is thus vital in determining the standard of review and
the constitutionality of the legislation. A recent challenge to a statute
setting six years as the minimum age for admission to public schools
helps clarify the issues in how an increased marriage age will be
viewed.58 Plaintiff, whose child was five years old, claimed that the
statute's classification worked a denial of equal protection. A three
judge federal district court, ruling against plaintiff, held that the reason-
able basis test was the appropriate standard for three reasons: public
education is not a fundamental constitutional right, age is not a suspect
classification, and the statute is within the realm of economic and social
welfare legislation. In a challenge to a minimum marriage age, how-
ever, a fundamental constitutional right-namely, marriage--is poten-
tially involved, but of the three cases found on the constitutionality of
different minimum marriage ages for males and females, only one held
that the fundamental right was affected.59 Thus, statutes setting a
higher minimum age for marriage may well be treated as creating age
classifications and as constituting legislation of a social welfare-economic
nature and thus be constitutionally evaluated only in terms of their rea-
sonableness.
Subject to limitations imposed by the United States Constitution,
each state is responsible for regulating the conditions under which mar-
riages may take place within its borders. 6 If there is to be a nation-
wide reduction in fertility from an increase in the minimum marriage
age, all of the states would have to adopt a higher minimum. The fed-
57. State v. Gans, 168 Ohio St. 174, 179, 151 N.E.2d 709, 712 (1958), cert. de-
nied, 359 U.S. 945 (1959).
58. Hammond v. Marx, 406 F. Supp. 853 (D. Me. 1975).
59. Phelps v. Bing, 58 I1. 2d 32, 316 N.E.2d 775 (1974). The other cases are
cited in note 55 supra.
60. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-
35 (1877).
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eral government evidently cannot impose a minimum, since the
regulation of marriage is a traditional state function.,1 However, the
federal government appears to be constitutionally capable of adopting
inducements to later marriage, for example, determining Social Security
benefits according to the insured's age at marriage. In a recent case,
the Supreme Court faced an equal protection challenge to a provision
of the Social Security Act under which widows of wage earners covered
by the Act were denied benefits unless their marriages had existed for
at least nine months prior to the wage earner's death.02  The Court
did not find that the right of marriage was affected but, rather, that
the statute fell in the area of social welfare. The Court thus used the
rational basis test and upheld the statute, saying, "a noncontractual
claim to receive funds from the public treasury enjoys no constitution-
all protected status, . . . though of course Congress may not invidi-
ously discriminate among such claimants on the basis of ... criteria
which bear no rational relation to a legitimate legislative goal."0' 8
Turning to a final problem, an increase in the age at marriage will
reduce fertility if illegitimacy does not rise substantially. A higher mar-
riage age, however, will tend to foster illegitimacy, and thus sanctions
against such births seem to be a logical corollary of a higher marriage
age. Even if the proportion of all births that are illegitimate was likely
to remain unchanged, the proportion is appreciable, as indicated
earlier, permitting sanctions against illegitimacy to have a significant
effect on fertility.
Such sanctions must be carefully constructed, however, in order
to be constitutionally valid. The Supreme Court has laid down the
principle that, even though differences between legitimate and illegiti-
mate children are to be tested for equal protection under the reasonable
basis standard, 64 "a State may not invidiously discriminate against illegi-
mate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children
generally."0' 5 Consequently, sanctions against illegitimacy will have to
be directed toward the parents; penalizing the illegitimate child for the
sins of his parents will not survive constitutional evaluation. 0
61. See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra. See also National League of Cities
v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).
62. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
63. Id. at 772.
64. Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976).
65. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (per curiam).
66. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972).
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Sanctions against the parents of illegitimate children must,
however, be designed with a great deal of care. School districts have
been held constitutionally unable to exclude from school female
students who have had an illegitimate child6" or to refuse to hire or
to discharge any teacher found to have had an illegitimate child68 unless
such students or teachers can be shown to have a harmful effect on
the educational process. Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that
"if the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."6 9 Thus, courts will look closely at
any scheme to deter adults from having illegitimate children, requiring
that the scheme be necessary to advance a compelling governmental
interest.
In conclusion, a higher minimum marriage age will lower fertility
only if the births that would have occurred with a lower age are
permanently averted. Thus, an increase in the minimum age may have
to be accompanied by more direct sanctions on fertility, including
illegitimacy. The constitutional authority to raise the minimum age
rests with the states, not the federal government, though the latter can
undoubtedly offer inducements to later marriage. A challenge to a
higher age under the due process and equal protection clauses may or
may not succeed, and a major factor in the outcome will be whether
the new age is seen as affecting the right of marriage or as simply an
age classification and thus whether the standard for evaluating its
constitutionality will be the compelling governmental interest test or the
less strict reasonableness test. Federal government inducements will
probably be tested only as to their reasonableness. However, sanctions
against illegitimacy,. whether imposed by a state or by the federal
government, will be seriously questioned. If directed toward the chil-
dren, the sanctions seem unlikely to be held valid even though only
the reasonable basis test is to be employed; if directed toward the
parents, the sanctions must be shown necessary to promote a com-
pelling governmental interest.
67. Perry v. Grenada Mun. Separate School Dist., 300 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Miss.
1969).
68. Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss.
1973), affd, 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 96 S. Ct. 1752 (1976).
69. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (some emphasis added, some
in original).
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LIMITING SPACE IN HOUSING
Evidence from scientific research indicates that limited space
reduces fertility among lower animal species as well as humans. Per-
haps the clearest evidence for humans comes from a study of a
community in South America containing two types of dwellings;
namely, individual houses and multiple-unit apartment buildings.
70
The former (but not the latter) were capable of expansion at the initia-
tive of the occupants through the addition of rooms; a tight housing
market drastically limited the ability of residents of the apartments to
move to more spacious quarters outside the community. Thus, a situa-
tion existed where those moving into apartments faced living space that
could not be expanded while those moving into individual houses were
not so constricted. The consequences for fertility were apparent and
substantial. After moving into the community, the birth rate among
the residents of houses did not change while the birth rate among the
residents of apartments fell. "Not a single apartment dweller, had more
than one child after moving, and 21 out of 30 had no children at all
while living in . . . [the community], despite the fact that apartment
dwellers tended to be younger than house dwellers. ' 71 Statistical con-
trols were introduced for characteristics, for example, age, education,
and fertility prior to moving into the community, on which the residents
of houses and apartments differed and which might account for the dis-
crepancy in birth rate. The conclusion remained unchanged that living
in an apartment inhibited fertility.
When economic and ecological conditions force the American
public to regulate fertility, limitations on living space thus may be con-
sidered as one means to stabilize or reduce population size. Such limi-
tations are likely to appear attractive because of the benefits they will
have for retaining land in agricultural production. Between 1960 and
1970, approximately 2,000 acres shifted from rural to urban use daily,
72
a loss that the United States can no longer afford. North America is
70. Felson & Solain, The Fertility-inhibiting Effect of Crowded Apartment Living
in a Tight Housing Market, 80 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1410 (1975). There is evidence that
space limitations have no effect on fertility. D. Johnson & A. Booth, Crowding and
Reproduction 11 (1975) (unpublished paper at University of Nebraska, Lincoln). In
isolating causal relationships, however, the Felson-Solauin study is superior, because the
same type of living conditions continued for and were studied over a substantial period
of time. See H. ZET'ERBERG, ON THEORY AND VmuFICATION IN SOCIOLOGY 134-35 (3d
ed. 1965).
71. Felson & Solafn, supra note 70, at 1422.
72. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 13, at 5.
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now the only major exporter of grain in the world, and the United States
accounts for the vast majority of North American grain exports. 73 Pre-
liminary estimates for the fiscal year ending in mid-1976 indicate the
following levels of net exports (indicated by a ±) and net imports
(indicated by a -) in millions of metric tons:
74
North America +94 Latin America - 3
Australia and Africa -10




The demand for North American grain is likely to continue, yet the
United States no longer has any idle cropland.75 Thus, the continued
reduction in rural land is impeding this nation's ability to deal with its
balance of payments and to influence the policies of other nations,
including their willingness to supply raw materials essential to the
economy of the United States.
There already exists statutory precedent for limitations by the fed-
eral government on dwelling unit living space. Federal savings and
loan associations are restricted in the amount of money they may loan
on single family houses.7 6 In regulating the amount of loans, the size
of dwellings is limited. Unfortunately, there does not appear to have
been a challenge to the constitutionality of such legislation, and it is
therefore difficult to evaluate the validity of an extension of the legis-
lation to a proscription of loans for housing with more than a specified
amount of space.
The Solar Heating and Cooling Demonstration Act of 1974 1 is
perhaps even more significant, because its goal of promoting solar
73. L. BRowN, BY BREAD ALONE 61 (1974). There appears to be a growing con-
sensus among scientists that the world is experiencing a cooling trend. If it continues,
a deleterious effect on grain production can be expected in virtually all parts of the world
However, the United States is likely to escape adverse effects, with the result that world
dependence on this country will be considerably greater than today. CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE AGENCY, POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF TRENDS IN WORLD POPULATION, FOOD
PRODUCTION, AND CLIMATE 27-31 (1974). See generally L. PONTE, THE COOLING
(1976).
74. L. BROWN, THE POLITICS AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NORTH AMERICAN
BREADBASKET 11 (Worldwatch Inst. Paper No. 2, 1975).
75. Id. at 7, 8.
76. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1970).
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5501-5517 (Supp. V 1975). Shortly thereafter Congress also
passed the Solar Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of 1974, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5551-5566 (Supp. V 1975).
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energy78 is the result of a recognized shortage of energy-producing
resources79 and resource shortages will probably be a major factor com-
pelling the adoption of fertility control measures. The Act provides
that, in structures furnished with solar energy under the demonstration
program established, the Secretary of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development is to consider designated factors "[i]n determining
the. . . floor area limitation of any federally constructed housing...
where -the law establishing the program under which. . . the housing
is constructed specifies such ... floor area limitation . . . ,,so A
first step has been taken, then, to restrict living space in dwelling units
constructed under the auspices of the federal government. Are such
restrictions constitutional? The answer appears to be affirmative.
The federal government has long been involved in the housing
field, and the sole challenge to the constitutionality of a federal housing
program that has reached the Supreme Court was rejected.8 1 More-
over, there is no constitutional requirement that federal or state govern-
ments provide their citizens with housing of a particular quality.82
Accordingly, the federal government has considerable latitude in the
housing fields; it may or may not enter the field, and when it does,
it may provide housing of the quality it chooses. Presumably the
amount of living space is an aspect of quality that the federal govern-
ment can constitutionally control in the housing for which it provides
financial assistance or that is financed through federally chartered sav-
ings and loan associations.
Another line of reasoning supports the proposition that the federal
government may directly limit the amount of space in housing, even
that for which it and federal savings and loan associations do not supply
financing. The Supreme Court has upheld local government regulation
of the maximum heights of buildings and the minimum sizes of lots on
the basis of the police power possessed by states and their political sub-
divisions.83 The police power has been used by a state court to vali-
date an ordinance prescribing a minimum amount of floor space." By
78. 42 U.S.C. § 5510(a).
79. Id. § 5501(a)(1).
80. Id. § 5511(a)(1).
81. City of Cleveland v. United States, 323 U.S. 329 (1945). The state also has
substantial authority in developing housing programs. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26 (1954).
82. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
83. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926); Welch v.
Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
84. Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 10 NJ. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952).
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analogy, these cases provide at least an argument that regulation of the
maximum amount of space is within the police power. The question
remains, however, whether the federal government possesses a police
power. The answer appears to be that it does-or at least that it has
the equivalent-for dealing with whatever affects or moves in interstate
commerce. The Supreme Court has held that, under the commerce
clause, Congress can prohibit the shipment in interstate commerce of
items produced by workers whose wages and hours of employment fail
to conform to congressionally imposed standards, suggesting that Con-
gress can ban building materials from interstate commerce if they are
to be used in dwelling units of a size larger than specified.
Congress, following its own conception of public policy concerning
the restrictions which may appropriately be imposed on interstate
commerce, is free to exclude from the commerce articles whose use
in the states for which they are destined it may conceive to be
injurious to the public health, morals, or welfare, even though the
state has not sought to regulate their use ...
Such regulation is not a forbidden invasion of state power
merely because either its motive or its consequence is to restrict
the use of articles of commerce within the state of destination; and
is not prohibited unless by other Constitutional provisions. 'It is no
objection to the assertion of the power to regulate interstate com-
merce that its exercise is attended by the same incidents which
attend the exercise of the police power of the states.8 5
However, Congress need not ban an item from interstate commerce in
order to control its use under a police-type power, for the power deriv-
ing from the commerce clause permits a direct regulation of use. Thus,
the First Circuit upheld a federal plan to reduce the number of parking
spaces in a city below that required by local zoning ordinances for the
purpose of minimizing air pollution. Since air pollution and motor
vehicles cross state lines, the commerce clause was held to give the fed-
eral government authority to control such pollution, and as a result it
"was free to promulgate rules that resemble local zoning ordinances;
this does not constitute 'usurpation of the police power' . . .. The
Federal Government may use the same tools as may the state when in
pursuit of an objective lawfully within -the power of either. '8'  The
commerce clause, in short, appears to authorize federal regulation of
space in dwelling units through control over the movement of building
materials in interstate commerce.
85. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941).
86. South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 677-78 (1st Cir. 1974).
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In conclusion, it should be noted that a property owner unable to
build a dwelling larger than the prescribed maximum will almost cer-
tainly not be entitled to damages under the fifth amendment prohibi-
tion against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. The amendment does not cover property deprived only
of its most beneficial use 87 or property that suffers only an indirect
encroachment from regulations necessary to protect the public health
and welfare.88
FAMILY SIZE RESTRICTIONS FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT
Government employees account for a substantial portion of the
labor force in the United States. In 1974, they constituted eighteen
percent of all non-agricultural employees, 89 with approximately one-
fifth working for the federal government and four-fifths working for
state and local governments.90 Given the magnitude of government
employment and the direct control that legislatures exert over such
employment, a fertility control measure likely to be considered is a
limitation on family size (to one or two children) for those employed
by government. 1 Since it is the regulation of future fertility that is
the goal, current and prospective employees who had or exceeded the
maximum family size prior to the implementation of the policy would
presumably not be discharged or refused employment unless they had
children after implementation; all other current or prospective employ-
ees would have their employment made contingent upon having no
more than the specified maximum number of children.
Would such a fertility control policy be constitutional? Discharg-
ing current employees or refusing to hire applicants who had exceeded
the maximum permissible family size prior to the adoption of the policy
is probably unconstitutional as a violation of the proscription against ex
post facto laws;9 2 in any event, such action would not permit control
over the future fertility of these persons, a goal of the policy. Assum-
ing that discharge or refusal to hire was limited only to those persons
whose childbearing continued and was excessive after adoption of the
87. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
88. Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897); Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S.
161 (1888); Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878).
89. STATISTICAL Ans'rR c, supra note 17, at 353.
90. Id. at 357.
91. India is now requiring government employees to limit the size of their families
to three children. N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1976, at 3, col. 4 (city ed.).
92. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
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policy, would there be a constitutional violation? The answer appears
to be affirmative, though there is some basis for believing otherwise.
The argument that it is constitutional to place restrictions on family
size as a condition of government employment can begin with the
recent challenge to a statute prohibiting federal employees from taking
an active role in political affairs, for example, campaignsY3 The statute
was attacked on the ground that it violated the rights of association and
political involvement guaranteed by the first amendment. However,
the Supreme Court responded that these rights were not absolute94 and,
since "the government has an interest in regulating the conduct and 'the
speech of its employees that differ[s] significantly from those it possesses
in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in gen-
eral,' "" the question of the constitutionality of the statute involved
balancing the interests of the employee against those of the public.
Given the interest of the public in a government work force free from
political interference, the Court upheld the statute.
Individuals do not have a right to public employment on their own
terms, and government may impose reasonable conditions on those it
hires." It is reasonable for a city to require its employees to be city
residents, and the question is simply one of the rationality of the con-
dition as long as a fundamental constitutional right is not involved. 97
Will a family size restriction on government employment infringe on
the fundamental right of procreation, requiring that the restriction be
necessary to satisfy a compelling government interest?98  The Supreme
Court has held that, in determining the amount of welfare benefits, a
classification by family size which discriminated against large families
"neither impinged upon a fundamental constitutional right nor em-
ployed an inherently suspect criterion."99
Public employment, like welfare, appears to be a form of govern-
mental benefit,100 and thus a classification on the basis of family size
93. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548 (1973).
94. Id. at 567.
95. Id. at 564 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
96. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
97. McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 96 S. Ct. 1154 (1976) (per
curiam).
98. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330 (1972).
99. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971); see Ward v. Winstead, 314
F. Supp. 1225 (N.D. Miss. 1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1019 (1971).
100. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972), in which employment by
a state was at issue and the Court spoke generally in terms of "a governmental benefit."
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for determining employment may simply be required to possess a
reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental interest, a test that
may be satisfied inasmuch as some direct and indirect impact on fertil-
ity will exist. However, if the right of procreation is held to be
infringed, the classification scheme will be subject to the more stringent
test of constitutionality under the equal protection guarantee. Since
government employees account for only one out of five workers and
since many current and prospective employees will be past their child-
bearing years, it is difficult to accept the argument that the classification
is necessary to attain the goal of reducing the fertility of the nation as
a whole. The infringement on constitutional rights by restrictions on
political activity by government employees, while valid, is unlikely to
be useful precedent to uphold a family size classification for hiring.
The limitation on political involvement is justifiable by an interest in
regulating the conduct of government employees as government em-
ployees in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of public
workers. Family size as a criterion for employment, however, is
directed toward influencing the birth rate of the nation as a whole, but
inhibiting the fertility of government employees will not in and of itself
make a major contribution toward this goal.
Will a family size criterion for employment be held to infringe the
right of procreation? The answer is uncertain, but three cases in which
sexuality was involved in employment decisions suggest that it will. In
the first, plaintiff was an employee of the federal government who was
discharged for living with a woman to whom he was not married.101
The court held his dismissal a violation of his constitutional right of pri-
vacy-the right protecting procreation 2--and required the govern-
ment to show a compelling reason for the dismissal. In the second
case, plaintiff was denied government employment solely because he was
a nudist and a member of a nudist club.10 3 The court held the ground
of denial insufficient because it penalized plaintiff's constitutional right
to associate without satisfying a compelling state interest. In the third
case, plaintiff was transferred from a teaching to a nonteaching position
and his contract was later not renewed after it was discovered that he was
a homosexual. 10 4 The transfer and contract non-renewal were upheld
101. Mindel v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal.
1970).
102. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
103. Bruns v, Pomerleau, 319 F. Supp. 58 (D. Md. 1970).
104. Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), a/I'd on other
grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
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because of other actions of plaintiff, not his homosexuality per se.
Indeed, the district court found that a homosexual/heterosexual classifi-
fication is suspect under the equal protection clause.
When sexuality is involved in employment decisions, then, courts
appear to require the more stringent test of constitutionality under the
equal protection clause. This suggests that a family size classification
in hiring will be viewed as infringing on the constitutional right of
procreation.
Furthermore, another line of cases also provides reason for believ-
ing that a family size classification is unconstitutional. These cases
require that there be a relationship between the criteria used for hiring
and discharging public employees and the duties of the employees. 0 5
The requirement, which appears to be based on the due process clause,
is that the criteria established for government employment must have
a reasonable bearing on the duties of the position for which the individ-
ual is hired. It is difficult to perceive a relationship between family
size and job performance, and without such a link, the family size classi-
fications will fail.
CONCLUSION
Four fertility control policies have been examined here on the
assumption that they will be seriously considered if the American pub-
lic commits itself to stabilizing or reducing the size of its population.
As indicated earlier, the population of the United States is continuing
to increase and, absent a marked upswing in the death rate, population
growth will persist for fifty years even with the smallest completed
family size that can reasonably be expected. At the same time, the
United States is heavily dependent on foreign sources for supplies of
raw materials essential to its economy. The dependence is likely to
increase at the same time that competition for supplies can be expected
to intensify as the result of rapid population growth in the world as a
105. Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (homosexuality); Andrews v.
Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss. 1973), aff'd, 507
F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 96 S. Ct. 1752 (1976) (illegitimacy); Doherty
v. Wilson, 356 F. Supp. 35 (M.D. Ga. 1973) (communal living); Burton v. Cascade
School Dist. Union High School No. 5, 353 F. Supp. 254 (D. Ore. 1973), af!'d, 512
F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975) (homosexuality); Bruns v. Pom-
erleau, 319 F. Supp. 58 (D. Md. 1970) (nudism); McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp.
809 (D. Minn. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. de-
nied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972) (homosexuality); Mindel v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (cohabitation). Contra, Anonymous v.
Macy, 398 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1041 (1969).
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whole.10 6 A collision between population size and resources seems
inevitable for the United States, and it is the occurrence or clear
imminence of that collision that is likely to lead to a fertility control
policy.
Americans appear unable or unwilling to anticipate and attempt
to avoid the collision. Evidence from social science indicates that
population growth is generally not a problem that, when recognized,
motivates individuals to change their own behavior. "[ihe weight of
evidence favors the prediction that . . . [individuals] will express sig-
nificantly greater support for statements that indicate that population
is a problem than for statements calling for immediate action."''1  An
impressive manifestation of the principle that population is an abstractly
perceived problem appeared in a study of the membership of Zero
Population Growth. 118 Among male members in their prime reproduc-
tive years who had no more than one child, those who recognized that
couples must restrict themselves to one child in order to halt population
growth immediately were as likely to intend to have two children as
those who erroneously believed that two children would stop population
growth. The lack of a relationship between knowledge and personal
commitment persisted even among those feeling that the current size
of the United States population was far above the optimum. Among
female members in their prime reproductive years who had no more
than one child, there was an association between the number of chil-
106. World population increased by an estimated 62 million in 1965, 69 million in
1970, and 64 million in 1975. Thus, the annual numerical increment in 1975 was
slightly larger than in 1965 but smaller than in 1970. Figures for 1970 and 1975 are
found in L. BROWN, WORLD POPULATION TRENDS: SIGNS OF HOPE, SIGNS OF STRESS 7-8
(Worldwatch Inst. Paper No. 8, 1976). Figure for 1965 is found in POPULATION REFER-
ENCE BUREAU, INC., WORLD POPULATION GROWTH AND RESPONSE 1965-1975, at 265
(1976).
107. McCutcheon & Vick, Racial Differences in Attitudes toward Population Con-
trol and Overpopulation as an Abstract Problem, 27 VA. J. Sc. 10, 11 (1976). See gen-
erally Kruegel, Further Comment on I. Blake's "Can We Believe Recent Data on Birth
Expectations in the United States?," 12 DEMOGRAPHY 157 (1975).
108. Barnett, Zero Population Growth, Inc.: A Second Study, 6 J. BIOSOCIAL SCI.
1 (1974) (undertaken in 1971).
It is noteworthy that the incentive for membership in Zero Population Growth is
not primarily self-interest but an interest in promoting the public welfare and that "the
most outstanding feature of ZPG members' incentives is the way self-interests are inex-
tricably blended and made compatible with interests that go beyond self." H. Tillock,
Group Size and Contributions to Collective Action: A Test of Mancur Olson, Jr.'s The-
ory on Zero Population Growth, Inc. 101 (1976) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Mich-
igan State University).
109. In this group, variation in the number of children thought necessary to halt
population growth immediately explained 25% of the variation in the number of children
personally intended. Barnett, supra note 108, at 15.
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dren thought necessary to halt population growth immediately and the
number personally intended; those who recognized the necessity of the
one-child family were more likely than those who did not to intend to
have no more than one child. The association was stronger among those
who felt -the United States had already exceeded its optimum population
by a substantial margin, but even among these members, the association
was of only moderate strength."0 9
Thus, the members of the most vocal organization working for
population stabilization in the United States are not characterized by
a strong link between knowledge of the action that is necessary to halt
population growth and personal commitment to that action. In view
of this, one cannot expect that the public generally will exhibit a strong
link until severe external constraints such as resource shortages compel
the realization that there is a dire threat to the American standard of
living from a population problem at home.

